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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CODE: CONSPIRACY 
PROVISIONSt 
Paul Marcus* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1966 Congress created the National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws. The authorizing statute directed the commis-
sion to study the criminal laws of the federal government and to recom-
mend revisions to improve the federal system of criminal justice. 1 The 
commission, chaired by the former governor of California, Edmund G. 
Brown Sr., consisted of a group of elected officials and appointed mem-
bers with unusually varied interests and had the assistance of an ex-
tremely able staff. The Brown Commission submitted its final report to 
the Congress in January 1971? The report and the commission's pro-
posal for a new federal criminal code underwent extensive changes 
before its consideration in the Senate as the controversial S. 1. This 
bill ultimately died in the Senate, however, and in May 1977, a modi-
fied version of the proposed code was introduced simultaneously as S. 
1437 in the Senate and H.R. 6869 in the House. After a lengthy report 
by the Committee on the Judiciary3 and some fairly extensive floor 
amendments, the Senate passed S. 1437 in early 1978.4 H.R. 6869 is 
currently before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice. Thus, four different federal criminal code re-
forms have been suggested within the past seven years: the Brown 
Commission recommendations, S. 1, the original S. 1437, which was 
identical to the present H.R. 6869, and the amended version of S. 1437 
that the Senate passed. 
·Although some have questioned the need for any law punishing 
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I. An Act to establish a National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Pub. L. 
No. 89-801, § 3, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966). 
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971). 
3. S. REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. 
4. 124 CONG. REC. S. 860 (1978). . 
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conspiracies,5 neither the Brown Commission nor Congress has ques-
tioned the necessity of such a statutory offense.6 The crime of conspir-
acy, however, creates difficult procedural and substantive problems at 
trial, and these problems have become more acute as federal prosecu-
tors have increasingly relied on conspiracy theories in the courts. Con-
sequently, a careful analysis of the current congressional proposals is 
essential. This article, although focusing on H.R. 6869 and the 
changes the bill would introduce in the law of conspiracy, will discuss 
the similarities and differences between the House bill and the other 
three proposals. Furthermore, changes in the bill which would im-
prove the administration of justice in the federal courts will be recom-
mended. 
II. INSTITUTING PROSECUTION FOR CONSPIRACY AND 
RELATED OFFENSES 
A. Venue 
One of the tactical advantages afforded to prosecutors in conspir-
acy prosecutions is that prosecution may be instituted not only in the 
district where the agreement was made/ but also where any overt act 
by any conspirator was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.8 
The venue provision in H.R. 6869 codifies this practice.9 Although 
Justice Holmes, arguing that the overt act was not an element of the 
crime of conspiracy, protested such a rule, 10 his view has not prevailed. 
Because the bill makes an overt act an element of the criminal offense 
and not simply proof of the crime, 11 the venue rule contained in the 
House bill is sound. 
In the past, however, prosecutors have abused this broad rule in 
certain areas. The venue provision of the final Senate version contains 
a significant improvement that does not appear in the House version. 
The Senate bill provides that charges of conspiracy to distribute ob-
scene materials may be brought only where the conspiracy was formed 
or where "a substantial portion of the conspiracy occurred." 12 Pre-
sumably, this provision would avoid the problem created by the so-
called "Deep Throat" prosecution, 13 in which defendants were forced 
to stand trial in a district they had never visited solely on the ground 
that one copy of a film was shown there. Considering the broad sweep 
5. See Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime o/ Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973); Mar-
cus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925 (1977). 
6. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 161. 
7. Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62 (1905). 
8. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). 
9. H.R. 6869 § 33ll(b). For the text of the sections of the House and Senate bills relating to 
conspiracy, see the appendix to this article. 
10. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
II. See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra. 
12. S.l437§33ll(b). 
13. United States v. Peraino, Cr. No. 75-91 (W.O. Tenn. 1977). 
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of conspiracy law in general, this venue limitation is especially signifi-
cant when the conspiracy prosecution is combined with the vague and 
confusing elements inherent in any obscenity charge. 
B. Co-Conspirator Liability 
Not only may a defendant in a conspiracy prosecution find himself 
prosecuted, because of the actions of his alleged co-conspirators, in a 
district he has never visited, he may also find himself defending against 
any number of crimes allegedly committed by a co-conspirator. Mr. 
Justice Douglas established the broad accomplice liability rule of co-
conspirators in his celebrated opinion in Pinkerton v. United States: 14 
A conspirator is liable for all criminal acts of his co-conspirators as 
long as those acts were reasonably foreseeable. Accepting the argu-
ment that the criminal acts are "sufficiently dependent upon the en-
couragement and material support of the group as a whole to warrant 
treating each member as a causal agent," 15 both the House and the 
Senate bills contain provisions that perpetuate the Pinkerton rule. 
Section 40l(b) provides that a conspirator is liable for a principal of-
fense if "the other person engages in the conduct in furtherance of the 
conspiracy; and the conduct is authorized by the agreement or it is rea-
sonably foreseeable that the conduct would be performed in further-
ance of the conspiracy." 
There are two reasons why the Brown Commission rejected the 
Pinkerton complicity rule and why the House should also do so. First, 
as Mr. Justice Rutledge noted in his dissent in Pinkerton, the rule con-
fuses two distinct bases of criminal liability. 16 One is the criminal 
agreement, punishable under the law of conspiracy. The other is ac-
countability for the acts of others, punishable under the law of accom-
plice liability. A defendant should be accountable for the commission 
of the substantive offense only if he. in fact aided the commission of the 
crime, not if he merely assented to it. Otherwise, the defendant is con-
victed twice for the single act of agreement. In accord with this ra-
tionale, many states do not allow convictions for both conspiracy and 
the substantive offense. In Illinois, for example, conspiracy is treated 
as an inchoate offense, and a statute expressly prohibits conviction for 
both the conspiracy and the object of the conspiracy. 17 Similarly, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the Pinkerton rule as 
a matter of state law: 
If the rule were otherwise, the fundamental distinction be-
tween a substantive offence and a conspiracy to commit that of-
14. 328 u.s. 640 (1946). 
15. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 69 (quoting Developments in the Law--Criminal 
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 998-99 (1959)). 
16. 328 U.S. at 648 (Rutledge, J ., dissenting). 
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-5 (1977). 
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fence would be ignored. Each is a separate and distinct offence 
and each may be separately punished .... Punishment is im-
posed for entering into the combination. This is not the same 
thing as participating in the substantive offence which was the ob-
ject of the conspiracy. While it has been said that a conspiracy is 
a "partnership in crime", ... that metaphor should not be pressed 
too far. It does not follow that such a partnership is governed by 
the same principles of vicarious liability as would apply in civil 
cases. Our criminal law is founded on the principle that guilt, for 
the more serious offences, is personal, not vicarious. One is pun-
ished for his own blameworthy conduct, not that of others. . . . 
To ignore the distinction between the crime of conspiracy and the 
substantive offence would enable "the government through the use 
of the conspiracy dragnet to convict a conspirator of every sub-
stantive offense committed by any other member of the ~roup 
even though he had no part in it or even knowledge of it." 1 
The second argument against the Pinkerton rule rests less on the 
distinct bases of criminal liability than on the mental state required for 
conviction. If a conspirator agrees to commit one· crime, under the 
Pinkerton rule and the House and Senate bills, he is liable for any 
other reasonably foreseeable crime committed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy by any co-conspirator, even if the conspirators never dis-
cussed or considered the other crime. The Criminal Justice Section of 
the American Bar Association has stated the objection to this result 
with great clarity: 
The Pinkerton rule represents a form of vicarious criminal li-
ability that, in essence, imposes liability for negligence. In the 
form of the rule adopted . . . a person is liable for a co-conspira-
tor's crime which was "reasonably foreseeable"; or, stated another 
way, the person is criminally liable if he should have known, when 
he agreed to become a part of the conspiracy, that there was a risk 
that the collateral offense would be committed. This is clearly 
negligence liability, and should be imposed only if there is strong 
justification. 19 
The Criminal Justice Section properly could not perceive any con-
vincing justification for imposing criminal liability for negligence on a 
party to a conspiracy. As the Brown Commission remarked, "the ar-
gument [supporting Pinkerton] seems to go no further than to support 
the provision which makes mere membership in a conspiracy a crime 
even though there is no complicity relationship to the crimes which 
may be committed."20 Moreover, the Pinkerton rule is unnecessary 
18. Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 48, 206 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1965). 
19. Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association Policy regarding S-1, The Proposed 
Federal Criminal Code (94th Congress) at 5 (adopted Aug. 1975). 
20. I NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 
157 (1970). 
No.2] PROPOSED CONSPIRACY PROVISIONS 383 
because of the broad sweep of the aiding and abetting provisions in the 
proposed bills.21 Consequently, the House should delete subsection 
40l(b) from the bill. Subsection (a) is sufficient to establish accounta-
bility for the conspirator who genuinely aided the principal in the of-
fense.22 
Ill. THE ELEMENTS OF AND DEFENSES TO CONSPIRACY 
A. The Definition o/ Conspiracy 
The definition of the offense of conspiracy has undergone little 
change from the Brown Commission proposal to the House version. 
Section 1002(a) of the House bill provides that a person is guilty of 
criminal conspiracy "if he agrees with one or more persons to engage in 
conduct, the performance of which would constitute a crime or crimes, 
and he or one of such persons in fact engages in any conduct with in-
tent to effect any objective of the agreement." This is the same defmi-
tion contained in the amended version of S. 1437 and is quite similar to 
that recommended by the Brown Commission. 23 The proposed section 
eliminates the confusion created by the numerous conspiracy provi-
sions in the United States Code, which contain different language and 
different overt act requirements.24 The improvement would no doubt 
be welcomed by prosecutors and defense attorneys who must often 
grapple with two different conspiracy statutes in the same trial. The 
proposed section also eliminates language in the current general con-
spiracy statute that has confused the courts for a good many years.25 
The current statute proscribes an agreement to commit an offense 
against the federal government "or to defraud the United States."26 
The fraud provision has occasioned inconsistent decisions by the fed-
eral courts and anomalous limitations by the Supreme Court. 
Although the crime of conspiracy is defmed in terms of a person 
who agrees to commit an unlawful act, the proposed section contains 
no defmition of agreement. This omission, however, was both inten-
tional and necessary. The perimeter of the federal conspiracy offense 
has been demarcated by literally thousands of reported decisions. This 
21. See H.B. 6869 § 40l(a)(l). 
22. Alternatively, the House could limit the scope of the Pinkerton rule without abandoning it 
by requiring that the crime committed by the co-conspirator in fact be contemplated by the par-
ties. Such a provision would eliminate liability for negligence, but still hold a conspirator responsi-
ble for the actions of co-conspirators. 
23. The most significant difference between the present proposals and the Brown Commission 
proposal is that the latter provided in§ 1004(1) that "the agreement need not be explicit but may 
be implicit in the fact of collaboration or existence of other circumstances." Because a large body 
of case law supports permitting the fmder of fact to draw such an inference, see, e.g., Direct Sales 
Co v. United States, 319 U.S. 703,714 (1943); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,80 (1942), this 
language is urmecessary and its omission was probably not intended to change the current law. 
24. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 161-62. 
25. See Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959). 
26. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (1970). 
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body of case law includes many opinions interpreting the meaning of 
"agreement," discussing the mental state required for an agreement, 
and prescribing the evidence necessary to prove an agreement. 27 In 
light of this highly developed body of law, an attempt to encapsulate 
the implications of the term "agrees" in a sentence or two would have 
been unfortunate. 
B. The "Unilateral" Agreement 
Although the proposed bill adopts by implication a considerable 
body of case law on the nature of a criminal agreement, the bill has 
expanded the judicial defmition in one troublesome respect. At com-
mon law and in the current general conspiracy statute, a criminal con-
spiracy occurs when "two or more persons conspire." All four versions 
of the proposed federal code impose criminal liability on a person who 
"agrees with one or more persons." 
The change is more than stylistic; it represents an intentional 
change in the substantive law. The proposed bill focuses on whether 
the defendant has agreed, not on whether several persons have agreed. 
The proposed bill thus adopts the Model Penal Code's "unilateral ap-
proach" to conspiracy and rejects the current requirement of a true 
agreement. 28 The bill, if enacted, will therefore permit a prosecutor to 
charge a single defendant with conspiracy if he agreed with another 
party, even though the other party did not genuinely agree with him. 
In State v. St. Christopher,29 for example, the defendant told his cousin 
that he planned to murder his mother, and he sought the cousin's aid. 
The cousin, under specific directions from the police, feigned agree-
ment, and the defendant was tried and convicted of conspiracy to com-
mit murder. Although no true agreement had been reached, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The court noted 
that the defendant's action was sufficient to constitute a crime under 
the Minnesota conspiracy statute, which is virtually identical to the 
proposed federal law. 30 
The St. Christopher decision is a thoroughly defensible interpreta-
tion of the Minnesota statute, and also of the proposed federal law, and 
reaches the result that the drafters of the Model Penal Code intended. 31 
A person charged with making a unilateral agreement should be pun-
ished, the drafters argued, because of "the unequivocal evidence of a 
27. See generally Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The State o.f Mind Crime-Intent, Proving 
Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 627. 
28. See MoDEL PENAL CODE§ 5.03, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
29. 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975). 
30. See MtNN. STAT.§ 609.175(2) (1974) ("Whoever conspires with another to commit a 
crime"). 
31. See Wechsler, Jones, & Kom, The Treatment o.f Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code 
o.fthe American Law lnsitute: Allempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pt. 2), 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 
966 (1961). 
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firm purpose to commit a crime."32 In my judgment, however, the 
unilateral approach is an unwarranted expansion of the scope of con-
spiracy law. Presently, a federal prosecutor must establish a true 
agreement between two or more persons; without such an agreement, 
no criminal conspiracy exists. The rationale for this requirement is 
that a conspiracy is particularly dangerous because of the concerted 
criminal action that it makes possible. The Supreme Court has said 
that 
collective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a 
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Con-
certed action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object 
will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the 
individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. 
Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, 
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those 
which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a con-
spiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has 
embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely the commis-
sion of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the 
group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy gener-
ates is not confined to the substantive offense which is the immedi-
ate aim of the enterprise. 33 
Although the unilateral approach is unlikely to have broad impact 
on the number of conspiracy prosecutions, the approach unjustifiably 
distorts the purpose of the separate crime of conspiracy. The "unilat-
eral conspirator" may be guilty of the crimes of attempt or solicitation, 
but he should not have to defend against a charge of conspiracy, partic-
ularly because the charge entails significant tactical disadvantages at 
trial. 
Both the current bill and the Brown Commission report contain a 
corollary of the unilateral approach. Under the provisions of both, it is 
no defense that the other conspirators were not convicted or were not 
even charged.34 The unilateral approach requires this result because it 
assumes that the genuine agreement, and hence the guilt, of co-conspir-
ators is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. The only concern of the 
statute is with the state of mind and actions of the defendant. The 
provision necessarily rejects the so-called Rule of Consistency. This 
rule provides that if only one conspirator is convicted, the conviction 
must be overturned because "[i]t is impossible in the nature of things 
for a man to conspire with himself .... [C]onspiracy imports a cor-
rupt agreement between not less than two with guilty knowledge on the 
32. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 5.03, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
33. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). 
34. H.R. 6869 § 1002(c). The bill that the Senate passed contains the same provision in § 
1002(d). 
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part of each."35 
The Senate, presumably to mitigate the harsh consequences of the 
unilateral approach, made an eleventh hour change in the Senate bill. 
The new subsection 1002(c) of S. 1437 provides: "It is a defense to a 
prosecution under this section that all of the persons with whom the 
defendant is alleged to have conspired have been acquitted because of 
insufficient evidence, not occasioned by a suppression order, that a 
conspiracy existed." This defense appears to be a half-way measure be-
tween the Rule of Consistency and the unilateral approach. On one 
hand, it would bar a conspiracy conviction if all other conspirators 
were acquitted of the conspiracy offense.36 On the other hand, S. 1437 
retains the original subsection precluding a defense when only some of 
the other conspirators have been acquitted or when they have not been 
charged. The disparity between the two subsections results in a confu-
sion that could be avoided by adhering to the traditional notion of a 
genuine agreement. Thus, the House bill should retain the present re-
quirement that "two or more persons conspire" and should also con-
tinue the Rule of Consistency. If a defendant cannot be convicted of 
conspiracy under these provisions, it is because he has not engaged in 
dangerous group planning activity. Such a defendant, however, will 
not necessarily escape criminal liability, because in many cases he can 
be convicted of either attempt or solicitation. 
C The Overt Act 
The current general federal conspiracy statute requires the prose-
cution to prove that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. The federal courts, however, have disagreed on whether 
other federal conspiracy statutes that do not expressly contain an overt 
act requirement should be construed to require proof of an overt act.37 
The requirement can have immense practical significance. The overt 
act often establishes venue, as well as the duration of the conspiracy, 
which in tum is important in determining the applicability of the stat-
ute of limitations, hearsay exceptions, and liability for substantive of-
fenses committed by co-conspirators. 
The proposal before the House, like each of the other three pro-
posals, explicitly requires proof of an overt act. The proposed defmi-
tion of conspiracy requires that the defendant, or one of the parties to 
the agreement, engage "in any conduct with intent to effect any objec-
tive of the agreement." The key language here is "any conduct," the 
35. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934) (Cardozo, J.). See generally Marcus, Con-
spiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 957-58 (1977). 
36. S. 1437 § 1002(c). The amendment apparently provides a defense only when all the co-
conspirators have been acquitted at the same trial. It is extremely unlikely that the Senate in-
tended to broaden the scope of the Rule of Consistency. 
37. Compare United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168, 172 & n.l (7th Cir. 1975) with United 
States v. King, 521 F.2d 61 (lOth Cir. 1975). 
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same language found in the present general conspiracy statute. 38 The 
courts have interpreted these two words literally. Proof of any con-
duct, no matter how insignificant, will usually satisfy this require-
ment.39 This broad interpretation of the overt act requirement is 
troubling because it betrays the rationale for the requirement. The 
reason for requiring proof of an overt act is to show that the conspiracy 
is in force and is "neither a project still resting solely in the minds of 
the conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in exist-
ence."40 Consequently, the better requirement is the one suggested by 
the former Director of the National Commission on Reform ofF ederal 
Criminal Laws for restricting "the scope of conspiracy by requiring 
proof of an overt act that is 'strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the actor's intent to complete the commission of the crime,' as in the 
proposed law of attempt."41 This formulation would require that the 
government carry a heavier burden with respect to both the nature of 
the act and the actor's state of mind. 
D. The Withdrawal Defense 
Under the present federal conspiracy statute, a defendant's with-
drawal from the conspiracy prior to the completion of the crime that 
was the object of the agreement does not constitute a defense to a 
charge of conspiracy. Withdrawal will, of course, eliminate responsi-
bility for the completed offense, but criminal responsibility for the con-
spiracy will remain unaltered.42 Adopting a position taken by the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code,43 all four proposals to revise the 
criminal code permit a defense to the conspiracy charge if the defend-
ant voluntarily "prevented the commission of every crime that was an 
objective of the conspiracy." Arguably, the mere attempt to prevent 
the achievement of the conspiracy's objects manifests a sufficient re-
nunciation of criminal intent to warrant permitting a defendant to es-
cape criminal sanctions.44 Nevertheless, the proposed defense is a 
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (boarding vessel to be used 
for importing marijuana several months before the planned crime is sufficient to establish overt 
act); Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937) (telephone call from Hawaii to California 
establishes venue in California). 
40. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957). 
41. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1971) (statement of 
Professor Louis B. Schwartz). 
42. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 166 n.74. 
43. See MODEL PENAL ConE§ 5.03(6) (Official Draft 1962). 
44. One review of those states that have enacted or considered enacting criminal codes since 
the promulgation of the Model Penal Code, for example, notes that eight states allow a defendant 
charged with conspiracy to defend on the basis that he "gave timely warning to law enforcement 
authorities or made a substantial effort to prevent the performance of the criminal conduct con-
templated." Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 
1122, 1170 (1975). The same review also notes, however, that 15 of the states surveyed have ad-
hered to the common law rule that provides no withdrawal defense to conspiracy. /d. at 1172. 
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distinct improvement over the current law and eliminates the difficult 
problems of proof that the more lenient defense would create. Conse-
quently, the House should approve the proposed defense. 
E The Statute of Limitations 
Section 5ll(d)(2)(a), included in both the Senate and House ver-
sions of the bill, provides that, for the purpose of determining when the 
st~tute of limitations begins to run, a conspiracy occurs 
on the day of the occurrence of the most recent conduct to effect 
any objective of the conspiracy for which the defendant is respon-
sible, or on the day of the frustration of the last remaining objec-
tive of the conspiracy, or on the day the conspiracy is terminated 
or finally abandoned. 
Both provisions thus provide that the statute of limitations will com-
mence to run when the last overt act was committed by the defendant 
or a co-conspirator, when the last planned objective was frustrated, or 
when the conspiracy was abandoned. This provision conforms to ex-
isting law and is soundly based; it should be adopted in its current 
form. 
IV. PUNISHMENT OF CONSPIRACY 
A. Penalties 
The proposed codes all depart from current statutory provisions 
for the penalty of the convicted conspirator. Under the present con-
spiracy statute, conspiracy is punished with a fme of not more than 
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.45 The 
statute makes no differentiation between conspiracies with different 
criminal objectives. Thus, a conspiracy to commit a crime is often 
punished less severely than the crime that is its object, but occasionally 
a conspiracy may be punished much more severely than would be the 
completed offense.46 This arbitrary penalty structure is difficult to jus-
tify and contrary to the purpose of the conspiracy offense to prevent the 
commission of the substantive crime. Relying on this purpose, the 
Brown Commission and the drafters of the House and Senate bills, in 
section 1002(d), have linked the conspiracy penalty to the penalty for 
the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy: 
An offense described in this section is an offense of the same 
class as the most serious crime that was an objective of the conspir-
acy, except that if the most serious crime that was an objective of 
the conspiracy is a Class A felony, an offense described in this 
section is a Class B felony. 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). If the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor, punishment 
cannot exceed the maximum punishment provided for commission of the misdeameanor. fd 
46. I NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REFORM OF fEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 
402 (1970). 
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B. Sentencing 
One of the major improvements on current law contained in the 
proposed law is the provision for the sentencing of the convicted con-
spirator. Here, as in the area of accomplice liability, the Pinkerton 
decision establishes the current rule: A conspirator may receive consec-
utive sentences for the conspiracy and the principal offense.47 The ra-
tionale for this rule is that the conspiracy and the completed crime are 
separate offenses and should be punished separately.48 Althougl:l in 
practice most convicted conspirators do not actually receive consecu-
tive sentences,49 the principle has been subject to persistent criticism. 
Most commentators, like the dissenters in Pinkerton, have argued that 
the purpose of the crime of conspiracy is to prevent the commission of 
the objective of the conspiracy. Consequently, when the conspiracy 
achieves its objective, the underlying crime alone should be punished. 
There should not be double prosecution and punishment. 50 
Responding to this criticism, the Brown Commission recom-
mended that consecutive sentencing generally not be allowed for the 
conspiracy and the completed offense. The recommendation has been 
followed in section 2304 of the proposed bill, which provides that "the 
terms may not run consecutively ... for [criminal conspiracy] ... and 
for another offense that was the sole objective of the ... conspiracy." 
Consecutive sentences, however, could be imposed for a conspiracy 
with numerous criminal objectives in a complex pattern of criminal ac-
tivity.51 Because the proposed bill would have little impact on prose-
cutorial effectiveness and because it would abandon the overly harsh 
Pinkerton rule, the change in the law should be enacted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
On the whole, the conspiracy provisions in the House bill for a 
new federal criminal code would greatly improve the administration of 
justice for conspiracy cases in the federal courts. Inconsistencies in the 
present statutory scheme would be eliminated, existing practices would 
be codified and thereby clarified, and the discretion of government 
prosecutors would, at least, not be broadened. Moreover, the elimina-
tion of consecutive sentencing, the adoption of a withdrawal defense, 
and the rationalization of the penalty structure would be substantial 
47. See United States v. Marchese, 438 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971); 
Johnstone v. United States, 418 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1969). 
48. Indeed, the Supreme Coun has sanctioned the imposition of a harsher penalty for the 
con~piracy than for the offense which was the object of the conspiracy. See Clune v. United 
States, 159 U.S. 590 (1895). 
49. Marcus, The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 938 (1977). 
50. Cf. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1958) (expressing in dictum the 
coun's disapproval of consecutive sentencing for convictions of the conspiracy and the completed 
crime). 
51. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 934. 
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improvements over the existing criminal code. Improvements in the 
current proposal, however, should be made. The adoption of the uni-
lateral approach to conspiracy, the retention of the minimal overt act 
requirement, and the codification of the Pinkerton complicity doctrine 
would provide the government with an undue and unnecessary advan-
tage in conspiracy prosecutions. Consequently, the House should con-
sider amending these portions of the bill before its fmal passage. 
Nevertheless, the bill, even in its present form, would represent such an 
improvement over the current confused state of the law of conspiracy 
that it should be passed. 52 
52. On August 17, 1978, the House Subcommittee introduced its own revision bill drastically 
limiting the impact of the Senate version and the original House version of the revised criminal 
code. This subcommittee bill, H.R. 13959, would keep the current federal conspiracy section, 18 
U.S.C. § 371, intact. See text accompanying notes 26-28, supra. Both versions are currently 
before the full House Judiciary Committee. 
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APPENDIX 
The Proposed Federal Criminal Code Conspiracy 
Provisions of S. 1437 and H.R. 6869 
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(Changes made in the Senate bill are indicated by italics and line-outs) 
"§ 1002. Criminal Conspiracy 
"(a) 0FFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if he agrees with 
one or more persons to engage in conduct, the performance of which 
would constitute a crime or crimes, and he, or one of such persons in 
fact, engages in any conduct with intent to effect any objective of the 
agreement. 
"(b) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.-lt is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution under this section that, under circumstances manifesting a 
voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defend-
ant prevented the commission of every crime that was an objective of 
the conspiracy. 
'</._j Tl T• • -1 #: , ,. -1 •L · ,~· (C] VEFE/lS£ ,.. 19 tl ctii!)CRNS dJ 61jJ,CS68GIJ•IfHI lt1Ro16? e.niS aeevHJif 
.~~ttn~ sl! ej" the ptNasna •vitk ••·kBm the tlifen.UNt ia alleged 18 heY-C ~" 
spi;wlkN•'C beeR NefNi:.'cllbeesNse ej"i»BNffieieRt eJ'itfltmee, MA' eeMa.~ 
by 9fiJJI»'CS9itffl errJe. .. , 1/tet fl CfJfispi?tlej· fYeis.W. 
"~(d) DEFENSES PRECLUDED.~ Except as provided in subsec-
tion (c), it is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that one 
or more of the persons with whom the defendant is alleged to have 
conspired has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, 
has been convicted of a different offense, was incompetent or irrespon-
sible, or is immune from or otherwise not subject to prosecution. 
"~(e) GRADING.-An offense described in this section is an of-
fense of the same class as the most serious crime that was an objective 
of the conspiracy, except that if the most serious crime that was an 
objective of the conspiracy is a Class A felony, an offense described in 
this section is a Class B felony. 
"(,e)(/) JURISDICTION. -There is federal jurisdiction over an of-
fense described in this section if any objective of the conspiracy is a 
federal crime with regard to which federal jurisdiction: 
"(1) is not limited to certain specified circumstances; or 
"(2) is limited to certain specified circumstances and any 
such circumstance exists or has occurred, or would exist or occur if 
any crime that is an objective of the conspiracy were committed. 
"§ 1004. General Provisions for Chapter 10 
"(a) DEFINITION.-As used in this chapter, a renunciation is not 
'voluntary and complete' if it is motivated in whole or in part by a 
decision to postpone the commission of the crime until another time or 
to substitute another victim or another but similar objective. 
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"(I) a belief that a circ1:1mstaaee eKists that ffiereases the 
prebability ef deteGtiea er appreheasiea ef the defeadaat er aa 
ether partiGipaat ia the Grime, er that makes mere diffie1:1lt the 
Geas1:1mmatiea ef the Grime; er 
~ 
"(b) INAPPLICABILITY To CERTAIN 0FFENSES.-It is not an of-
fense under this chapter: · 
"( 1) to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to so-
licit the commission of: 
"(A) an offense described in section 1001 (Criminal At-
tempt, 1002 (Criminal Conspiracy), or 1003 (Criminal Solici-
tation); 
"(B) an offense described in section 1202 (Conspiracy 
against a Foreign Power) or 1764 (Antitrust Offenses); or 
"(C) an offense described outside this title that consists 
of an attempt, a conspiracy, or a solicitation; or 
"(2) to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit unless it 
was in fact completed, or to solicit the commission of, an offense 
described in section 1115(a)(3) (Obstructing Military Recruitment 
or Induction), 1116(a)(l) (Inciting or Aiding Mutiny, Insubordina-
tion, or Desertion), or 183l(a)(l) (Leading a Riot). 
"§ 401. Liability of an Accomplice 
"(a) LIABILITY IN GENERAL-A person is criminally liable for 
an offense based upon the conduct of another person if: 
"(1) he knowingly aids or abets the commission of the of-
fense by the other person; or 
"(2) acting with the state of mind required for the commis-
sion of the offense, he causes the other person to engage in conduct 
that would constitute an offense if engaged in personally by the 
defendant or any other person. 
"(b) LIABILITY AS COCONSPIRATOR.-A person is criminally lia-
ble for an offense based upon the conduct of another person if: 
"(1) he and the other person engaged in an offense under 
section 1002 (Criminal Conspiracy): 
"(2) the other person engages in the conduct in furtherance 
of the conspiracy; and 
"(3) the conduct is authorized by the agreement or it is rea-
sonably foreseeable that the conduct would be performed in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. 
"§ 511. Time Limitations 
"(d) TIME WHEN OFFENSE COMMITTED. -Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, for purposes of this section the commission of an 
offense occurs 
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"( 1) if the offense is other than a continuing offense, on the 
occurrence of the last remaining element of the offense; or 
"(2) if the offense is a continuing offense involving: 
"(A) criminal conspiracy, on the day of the occurrence 
of the most recent conduct to effect any objective of the con-
spiracy for which the defendant is responsible, or on the day 
of the frustration of the last remaining objective of the con-
spiracy, or on the day the conspiracy is terminated or fmally 
abandoned; 
"§ 2304. Multiple Sentences of Imprisonment 
"(a) IMPOSITION OF CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE TERMS.-If 
multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the 
same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who 
is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms 
may run concurrently or consecutively, except that the terms may not 
run consecutively:~ for an offense described in section 1001 (Crimi-
nal Attempt), 1002 (Criminal Conspiracy), or 1003 (Criminal Solicita-
tion), and for another offense that was the sole objective of the attempt, 
conspiracy, or solicitation. 
"§ 3311. Venue for an Offense Committed in more than one District 
"(a) IN GENERAL-Except as otherwise provided, an offense be-
gun in one judicial district and completed in another, or committed in 
more than one district, may be prosecuted in any district in which the 
offense was begun, continued, or completed. 
"(b) CoNSPIRACY 0FFENSES.-A conspiracy offense, for pur-
poses of subsection (a), is a continuing offense, and may be prosecuted 
in any district in which the conspiracy was entered into or in which any 
person engaged in any conduct to effect an objective of the conspiracy. 
A conspiracy to commit an offense under section 1842 (Disseminating Ob-
scene Material) may be prosecuted only in a district in which the conspir-
acy was entered into or in which a substantial portion of the conspiracy 
occurred A substantive offense that is committed pursuant to a con-
spiracy may be prosecuted with the conspiracy offense in any district in 
which the conspiracy offense may be prosecuted. 
